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Abstract 
This paper explores the effects of offshoring, technology and Chinese import competition on labor market polarization in European 
countries. We find that polarization occurs mostly as a result of polarization within individual industries, while the reallocation of 
employment away from less polarized industries towards more highly polarized industries contributed only about one third of the total 
change. We find that both technological change and Chinese net import competition contributed to labor market polarization, but that 
they did so in distinct ways. In European manufacturing industries, ICT adoption explains a third of within-industry polarization, while 
Chinese net import competition contributed to a much smaller extent. The process of between-industry polarization is driven by 
widespread deindustrialization and servitization in developed countries. We find that Chinese net import competition explains about a 
fifth of the employment decline in lowly-polarized manufacturing industries and was thus an important driver of the reallocation of labor 
within economies away from lowly polarized manufacturing industries. We present tentative evidence that employment grew faster in 
initially highly polarized service industries. Moreover, these industries appear unaffected by their indirect IO-exposure to Chinese net 
import competition, while this was not the case for initially lowly polarized service industries. While polarization patterns in different 
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1 Introduction 
One of the most notable developments in labor markets in the last two decades is the so-called “polarization” of 
employment, with employment growth “polarizing” into relatively high-skill, high-wage jobs and low-skill, low-
wage jobs. In this process, the middle of the employment distribution in terms of skills and wages, consisting mainly 
of the routine jobs, has been hollowed out producing a typical U-shaped pattern of labor market dynamics in most 
advanced countries. This labor market evolution has puzzled researchers as it ran in contrast with the existing theories. 
One of the most broadly accepted theories of skill-biased technological change predicts a shift in demand towards 
more educated workers, but not towards low-skilled workers. It thus cannot explain the U-shaped shift in labor 
demand. 
The literature has so far identified three complementary explanations for the observed labor market developments. 
First, Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) stress the importance of the ongoing automation and offshoring of middle-
skilled “routine” tasks that used to be performed primarily by workers with moderate education (such as clerical and 
craft occupations). As these routines are sufficiently well defined, they can be carried out successfully by either a 
computer executing a program (automation) or by less-educated labor in developing countries. Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee (2014) predict that in the “second machine age” the growth in productivity has been decoupled from jobs 
and income as in the digital economy a set of goods and services can be provided at a cost that is often close to zero. 
New technology does not inevitably reduce the overall demand for labor, but shifts demand to different kinds of work 
contributing to the U-shaped pattern of labor market evolution. So far, most research has focused on this technological 
channel triggered by innovation and automation (e.g. Autor, 2015). Goos et al. (2014) show that the main effect 
comes from ‘routine biased technological change’, while offshorability of routine tasks has also contributed to 
polarization. However, Goos et al. use a subjective indicator taken from surveys to capture the ‘offshorability of 
tasks’ rather than a trade-based measure of offshoring. Moreover, their measure does not vary over time, which 
arguably might be important when analyzing polarization. Oldenski (2014) analyzes the impact of offshoring on 
polarization in the United States using a newly constructed measure, based on the total sales by a foreign affiliate of 
a U.S. multinational as a share of its total sales. While not much of an effect is found on average wages and 
employment, significant effects of both offshoring and technological change (proxied by the use of ICT) are found 
on polarization patterns in the U.S. 
A second explanation highlights the importance of globalization and offshoring as an essential source of changes 
in the labor market structure in advanced countries (see Blinder, 2009a, 2009b). Routine jobs such as assembly lines 
are being progressively offshored to lower-wage countries, which diminishes demand for labor in the middle of the 
wage distribution. On the other side, increased competition from low-wage countries with their own products in the 
low-tech and middle-tech industries aggravates these pressures on middle-wage jobs in advanced countries. These 
pressures have intensified in particular after China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. Since the entry of China into the 
WTO in 2001 until the crisis in 2008, U.S. and EU manufacturing employment declined by 3.5 and 3.6 million units, 
respectively. Autor et al. (2013) estimate that about a quarter of the aggregate decline in U.S. manufacturing 
employment is due to the rise of Chinese import penetration. The findings of Donoso et al. (2014), Dauth et al. (2014) 
and Balsvik et al. (2013) confirm that the Spanish, German and Norwegian local labor markets that are specialized 
in industries competing with Chinese imports, underwent a similar fate. While it is clear that globalization has had 
an important impact on this process of deindustrialization, not much evidence exists on how globalization, 
deindustrialization and polarization are related. In a recent contribution, Keller and Utar (2016) linked the rise in 
Chinese imports to the decline in Danish middle-paid manufacturing jobs, which has further aggravated employment 
polarization. As workers are pushed out of middle-paid employment in manufacturing, they transfer to low-wage 
services or high-wage employment. These effects hold when controlling for offshoring and technology, suggesting 
that Chinese import competition operates separately from these channels and is an alternative force of labor market 
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polarization. Overall, the estimates suggest that Chinese import competition accounts for about a fifth of total mid-
paid employment decline in the Danish national labor market. 
Finally, a third explanation suggests there is a link between job polarization and wage inequality. Studies by 
Manning (2003) and Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013) stress that the increased polarization in the income distribution in 
the United States and the United Kingdom may have affected the labor market. A surge in the share of income going 
to the rich may have contributed to the shift in demand for low-skill labor to provide “services to the rich”. 
In this paper, we focus on the relative importance of two competing explanations for the observed pattern of 
polarization in advanced countries - globalization versus technological change. Here, globalization is captured by 
two different variables, the offshoring and Chinese import competition. Also, the impact of technology on 
polarization was studied using two measures – R&D-induced and ICT-induced technological change. In addition to 
this, we also explore whether differences in labor market institutions can help explain the discrepancy in polarization 
patterns between countries. In order to do so, we use disaggregated industry-level data for a large sample of 19 
European OECD countries for the period 1997-2010. This enables us to study differential labor market developments 
in countries that have been engaged in offshoring on both sides. Arguably, in advanced EU countries engaged in 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) labor market polarization will be more pronounced than in countries 
receiving FDI and consequent increase in demand for routine jobs. We will explore this heterogeneity in labor market 
polarization between the different countries that make up our sample. We also contribute to the literature by 
simultaneously examining the effects of offshoring, technology and Chinese import competition in a large cross-
country sample rather than at the individual country level. Finally, we analyze how labor market institutions may 
affect polarization patterns. These institutions could affect the relative wages of different skill groups. Therefore, we 
would expect that the impact of both technological progress and the emergence of GVCs may be different depending 
on the type of regulations and wage setting institutions that prevail in various countries. To perform this analysis we 
analyze both manufacturing industries and private industries other than manufacturing. This allows us to tease out 
various relationships between the degree of involvement in GVCs, technological change, Chinese import 
competition, institutions and polarization at the industry level. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: First, polarization is a phenomenon that is predominantly driven 
by polarization within individual industries. The reallocation of employment away from lowly polarized industries 
with relatively more mid-skill jobs, such as manufacturing, towards highly polarized industries with relatively more 
low- and high-skill jobs contributes about one third to the overall polarization. Second, both technological change 
and Chinese import competition have contributed to labor market polarization. However, they have affected the labor 
market in disparate ways. Our estimates show that ICT adoption in manufacturing industries can explain around a 
third of the relative increase of high-paid employees in manufacturing, while Chinese net import competition 
accounts for only four percent of the total effect. However, in line with findings elsewhere in the literature Chinese 
net import competition explains about a fifth of the overall decline of employment in manufacturing industries or a 
loss of 944.000 manufacturing jobs across Europe, while technology did not have a clear effect. Hence, Chinese net 
imports are particularly relevant in explaining the reallocation of labor in the economy away from lowly polarized 
manufacturing industries. Moreover, our estimates indicate that initially more polarized service industries grew faster 
than their less polarized counterparts. Third, we present tentative evidence that employment grew faster in initially 
highly polarized service industries. Less polarized service industries also suffered indirectly from their exposure to 
the Chinese net import penetration shock in manufacturing, but their more polarized counterparts did not. These 
different employment trends explain how deindustrialization and the servitization of the economy led to greater 
polarization in the overall labor market. Fourth, we find no direct proof that labor market institutions are behind the 
heterogeneous patterns of polarization in European labor markets. Since we do not have data on wage polarization, 
our findings do not exclude that labor market institutions are relevant in affecting wage polarization. Nevertheless, 
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our results suggest that there is ample scope for policies such as skill-development programs, activation policies and 
sufficient social protection to facilitate smooth transition processes for affected workers. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the data and provide some 
stylized facts on job polarization in various OECD countries. In section 3 we perform an econometric analysis to 
assess to what extent polarization is correlated with technical change, Chinese import competition and the emergence 
of GVCs. We focus primarily on polarization that occurs within a given industry but also analyze polarization that 
has occurred as a result of the reallocation of employment to more highly polarized industries. Section 4 concludes 
the paper. 
2 Data and Basic Facts 
2.1 Occupations and Polarization 
Our main data source to study the dynamics of labor polarization in the European Union is the harmonized 
European Labor Force Survey (ELFS) provided by EUROSTAT, which provides very detailed employment 
statistics. The data contains information from 1995 to 2010 on employment status, the International Standard 
Occupational Classification (ISCO) codes, gender, and other major labor market characteristics of the workforce for 
each NACE two-digit industry within 19 European countries5. Since the data do not suffice to carry out an analysis 
on wage polarization, our analysis is entirely concentrated on the issue of employment polarization. We follow Autor 
and Dorn (2013) and Goos et al. (2014) and order occupations by average wage level. Having data on a detailed 
sectoral level rather than the more aggregated country level lends us the ability to account for the different degrees 
of technological change, product market competition and hence productivity growth which have an impact on demand 
for different skills. An additional appealing feature of our data set is the possibility to explore the heterogeneity 
between and within sectors. 
In Table 1 we take a first look at the existence of polarization during the period from 1997 to 20076. The table 
shows the long-term pattern of labor market polarization in terms of employment shares by different occupational 












                                                                    
5 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Great-Britain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary and Ireland. 
6 In 2011 the new ISCO08 codes were implemented and the data suffers from a structural break that cannot be overcome 
through concordance procedures. 2010 is thus chosen as the endpoint of our analysis in the paper. We choose 2007 as an end point 
in this part as this is most consistent with the rest of the analysis in the paper. However, all conclusions here are unaltered once 






Table 1: Average Share of Employment by major occupational groups, 1997-2007 (Europe) 
   %point change RTI 
Occupation (ISCO) 1997 2007 1997-2007  
low Paying 23.6 25.4 1.8  
Elementary occupations 10.2 10.7 0.5 2.11 
Service and Sales Workers 13.5 14.8 1.3 -0.65 
     
Middle Paying 46.4 39.9 -6.5  
Clerical Support Workers 15.4 12.7 -2.7 1.59 
Craft and Related Trades Workers 17.5 14.2 -3.3 1.53 
Plant and Machine Operators 13.5 13.0 -0.5 1.85 
     
High Paying 30.0 34.7 4.7  
Technicians and Associate Professionals 15.1 17.9 2.8 -0.57 
Professionals 9.8 11.3 1.5 -1.31 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 5.1 5.5 0.4 -1.39 
Authors’ calculations based on ELFS Data, for 19 European countries for which data are available for the period 
1997-2010. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Great-Britain, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Norway, Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, Finland. 
Middle-paid occupations have declined as a share of total employment (-6.5 percentage points), while low-paid (+1.8 
percentage points) and high-paid (+4.7 percentage points) occupations have gained as a share of total employment. 
Henceforth we shall refer to the increase of low-paid occupations relative to middle-paid occupations as low-paid 
employment polarization and the increase of high-paid occupations relative to mid-paid occupations as high-paid 
employment polarization. Table 1 also reports the Routine Task Index (RTI) used in Goos et al. (2014) and averaged 
by the eight occupational categories that we use. The higher the index, the more routine the tasks are considered to 
be. It is clear that in the middle-paid occupations this RTI index is highest, suggesting that these middle-paid 
occupations can be mostly considered as routine tasks. Routine tasks are more exposed to skill biased or routine 
biased technological change. They are also subject to offshoring because of changing relative prices and international 
specialization along GVCs. Table 1 reports averages across various countries. However, by using averages a lot of 
heterogeneity in polarization across countries is masked. This is demonstrated in figure 1. The figure shows long-run 
polarization across EU countries between 1997 and 2007. In accordance with table 1, we have grouped the 
employment shares of the eight occupational categories into three broad occupational groups reflecting their wage 
structure: low-paid, middle-paid and high-paid. The figure shows the prevalence of labor market polarization, but at 
the same time there are a number of noticeable differences in patterns and magnitude across countries. For instance, 
the Czech Republic has undergone a decline in the share of low-paid occupations, rather than a rising share. Other 
countries follow the typical polarization pattern, but the growth rate of the various occupational shares varies between 
them. Although the United States is not included in our sample, statistics in the literature of this country have 
demonstrated that the trend is also observed along the dimensions we would expect (Katz and Margo, 2014). 
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Figure 1: Heterogeneity in polarization, European countries, 1997-2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELFS 
2.2 Within-sector and between-sector polarization 
The increase in polarization that we observe at the national level can occur as a result of polarization within individual 
industries or employment shifting away from industries that are initially lowly polarized to industries that are more 
polarized. The latter type of polarization might be particularly of interest given the decline of manufacturing and the 
shift towards services in developed economies. 
In table 2 we report the average polarization by NACE one-digit industry in 1997 and 20077 and the average 
change in employment share. Employment polarization is computed by dividing the sum of low- and high-skilled 
employees by the total number of employees in an industry. As before, we divide occupations into skill groups in 
accordance with Goos et al. (2014) 8 . The table reveals that polarization has risen in nearly every industry. 
Interestingly, the table also shows that there are large differences in the average level of polarization between the 
different industries. For instance, manufacturing is a relatively low-polarized industry whereas real estate and 
business services is on average amongst the more polarized industries in Europe. Deindustrialization also led to 
employment shifting away from the former, while the share in aggregate employment of the latter grew. 
To understand the contribution of within-industry polarization and structural shifts between industries, we 
decompose aggregate polarization of a country c, Polarc, into a within- and between-industry term in equation (1) as 
                                                                    
7 We chose 1997 as the initial year because data for some countries are missing in 1995 and 1996. Since observations for Slovakia 
in the ELFS start from 1998 onwards, we use 1998 to compute the averages of that country for 1997. We set 2007 as the final 
year of our analysis since the NACE industry codes changed in 2008 causing a structural break in the series.  
8 See table 1. 
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also done by Goos et al. (2014). We also account for differences between the relative contributions of high- and low-
skilled employees to overall polarization in our decomposition. In this way we can test whether the process of 
polarization is fully symmetrical at the high- and low-paying end of the labor market, as our decomposition should 
show similar contributions of both groups of employees. We then analyze the relevance of each factor. In our 
econometric analysis in section 3 we mostly focus on polarization in both two-digit manufacturing industries and 
one-digit non-manufacturing industries. For the purposes of analyzing broad shifts across sectors in this section, one-
digit industries are preferable. 
Table 2: Average polarization  and change in aggregate employment share by industry in 1997 and 2007 
 
Industry Fraction of high- and low-paid 
employees in total employment 
Change in the share of overall 
employment 
 1997 2007 𝚫 1997 2007 𝚫 
Agriculture 0.49 0.52 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
Mining 0.30 0.34 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
Manufacturing 0.32 0.37 0.05 0.26 0.22 -0.04 
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.41 0.50 0.09 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
Construction 0.25 0.27 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.00 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.67 0.71 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.01 
Hotels and restaurants 0.91 0.91 -0.00 0.04 0.05 0.01 
Transport and Communication 0.33 0.37 0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.01 
Financial intermediation 0.54 0.64 0.10 0.04 0.03 -0.01 
Real Estate and business services 0.71 0.78 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.03 
Public administration 0.67 0.74 0.07 0.08 0.08 -0.00 
Education 0.77 0.82 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.00 
Health and Social work 0.88 0.90 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.01 
Other Services 0.72 0.75 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELFS data. Simple (unweighted) averages computed across all countries in the sample. 
                      ∆𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑐 =                  ∑∆𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟ic𝑆ic
𝑖⏟          
Within-term
                                 +∑Δ𝑆ic𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟ic
𝑖⏟        
Between-term
 
 = ∑ ∆𝐿𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑆ic𝑖⏟       
Within-low-paid
polarization term
+ ∑ ∆𝐻𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑆ic𝑖⏟       
Within-high-paid
polarization term
+∑ Δ𝑆ic𝐿𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  𝑖⏟          
Between-low-paid 
polarization term
+∑ Δ𝑆ic𝐻𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   𝑖⏟          
Between-high-paid 
polarization term
               (1) 
 Where 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑐  is the within-industry polarization, 𝐿𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑐 is the number of low-skilled employees relative 
to the total number of employees, 𝐻𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑐  is the number of high-skilled employees relative to the total number of 
employees and 𝑆𝑖𝑐  is the employment share of the industry relative to total employment in all considered industries 
of country 𝑐. The change is computed over the period of 1997 to 2007. In figure 3 we show the results of this 
decomposition by country and list the average for the European countries in the middle of the graph. Countries are 
sorted according to the percentage point rise in total polarization, Δ𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑐, which is reported as an integer number 
by country. 
The existence of heterogeneity in cross-country polarization patterns that we reported earlier is again emphasized 
in the results of the decomposition. Moreover, both the increase in polarization within individual industries and the 
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reallocation of employment towards more highly polarized industries is causing overall national polarization. 
However, the within-industry component is the most important contributor to overall polarization. On average, it 
explains 68%, or 4.3 percentage points, of the 6.3 percentage points increase of low- and high paid employment in 
total employment in the European countries. Generally within-industry high-paid employment polarization 
contributes the largest overall fraction to total polarization across all countries. In contrast, within-industry low-paid 
employment polarization varies considerably across the different countries. In eight of the nineteen reported countries 
in our sample it has exerted a downward pressure on overall polarization. This suggests that employment polarization 
has not occurred symmetrically for low- and high-paid employment across all labor markets of Europe. 
Figure 3: Within/between-sector decomposition of polarization, European countries, 1997-2007 
 
Note: Total percentage point increase in polarization ratio by country expressed as integer number  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELFS 
The average contribution of each sector to the overall within-industry component of polarization is examined in table 
3. Similar to what was reported in table 2, we find that almost all industries are contributing positively to overall 
within-industry polarization and this is generally driven by the high-paid within-industry employment polarization 
component. This implies that within-sector polarization persistently features across all industries of the economy 
rather than being limited to a few individual industries. Although there is some variation across countries in the 
general contribution of each industry to the total within-sector polarization term, manufacturing and wholesale and 
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retail trade generally appear as the largest overall contributors9. Meanwhile, the reallocation of employment away 
from manufacturing as a result of deindustrialization in high-income countries and towards industries such as 
business services and health and social work drives the between-industry term. Hence, based on this evidence, 
manufacturing plays a prevalent role in explaining overall polarization. Moreover, as will be shown presently, 
manufacturing has also been highly susceptible to Chinese import competition, offshoring and technological change. 
Table 3: Average individual sector contributions to within/between decomposition, European countries, 1997-2007 
 Within  Between 
Industry Low-paid High-paid Total Industry Low-paid High-paid Total 
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Note: Simple (unweighted) averages computed across all countries in the sample. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELFS data. 
 
                                                                    
9 We have done the same within/between-decomposition at the manufacturing level. There, the within-industry term explains 
around 92% of total polarization on average, leaving little to be explained by reallocation of employment between the individual 
manufacturing industries of a country. 
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2.3 Technological change, Global Value Chains and Institutions 
To capture technological change or innovation we rely on two different proxies. First, we use the R&D intensity of 
a sector taken from the OECD statistics database (OECD, 2016) . This variable relates the R&D expenditure in a 
sector 𝑖 of country 𝑐 to the value added, 𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑐𝑡 that is generated in that same industry and is formally defined as:  
𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑐𝑡
.      (2) 
The use of R&D as a proxy for technological change is predicated on a rich literature that has aimed to relate process 
and product innovation at the firm-level to employment changes. Specifically, Klette and Forre (1998) and, more 
recently, Bogliacino et al. (2012) both used R&D expenditure to proxy for innovation. Interestingly, Bogliacino et 
al. also found that R&D as a proxy for innovation not only mattered for firms in manufacturing industries but also 
for firms active in services industries. This strengthens our belief that R&D expenditure can also be used as a 
trustworthy proxy for technological innovation in non-manufacturing industries. In light of the findings of Goos et 
al. (2016), we use the ICT capital services per hour worked, ICTict, from EU Klems as an additional indicator of 
technological change. Goos et al. (2016) show that there is a positive correlation between the intensity of ICT capital 
use and the measured polarization within the industry. In contrast with R&D Intensity, which is a measure of 
technological innovation particularly relevant within manufacturing, ICT capital intensity is a measure of technology 
adoption that shows large variation both across manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. 
As an indicator of the integration of an industry in GVCs and hence the likelihood that tasks are more easily 





.      (3) 
This variable is collected from the 2015 version of OECD and WTO (2015)’s Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) 
Database. 𝐹𝑉𝐴 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡  represents the foreign value added in the gross exports of industry 𝑖 in country 𝑐 at time 
𝑡 and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡  are the gross exports of that same industry. A higher value indicates that an industry relies more on 
international specialization and hence international fragmentation of the production process, reflecting comparative 
advantages across industries and countries10. 
As a measure of Chinese net import penetration we use the share of Chinese net imports in total industry domestic 
absorption11:  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡








),    (4) 
calculated on the basis of the WIOD database (Timmer et al., 2015). A positive value indicates that an industry 
is mostly exposed negatively to China through import competition while a negative value shows that China offers 
                                                                    
10Data on the foreign component of value added in exports in the TiVA database is not available annually for all years of our 
sample. The data is available only for 1995, 2000, 2005, and the period 2008-2011. In order to improve the sample size, we 
have used linear interpolation to fill in the missing data. In table A1 in appendix A we show that both in terms of the initial 
levels of GVC involvement and the evolution over the time frame 1995 to 2010 countries show considerable heterogeneity.  
11 Domestic absorption reflects the domestic consumption of an industry’s goods. It is computed as 𝐷𝑜𝑚. 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡 +
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡 Where 𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the gross output of an industry 𝑖 of country 𝑐 during year 𝑡, 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡 are the imports by country 𝑐 during year 𝑡 
of industry 𝑖 goods produced in other countries and 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡 are the exports by industry 𝑖 in country 𝑐 during year 𝑡.
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new export opportunities for that industry12. In figure A1 in appendix A, we present the change in Chinese (net) 
import penetration from 1995 to 2007 by country for the private economy and for manufacturing. The graph shows 
that manufacturing industries have been highly exposed to increasing Chinese import competition. Moreover, the 
change in exposure has varied across countries and this variation becomes even larger when considering the net 
import exposure. Central-European countries in particular have seen the largest increase in Chinese import 
penetration over the period. 
Finally, we supplement our data with several additional country-level indicators on institutions from the OECD 
databases. In particular, we are interested in how labor market regulation, such as employment protection legislation, 
unionization, minimum wages, etc. might dampen or strengthen the evolution in job polarization. Therefore, we 
include the union density, the OECD index of employment protection legislation13 and an adjusted Kaitz index14. We 
present summary statistics for all main variables included in our regression samples in tables A2 and A3 of appendix 
A.  
In table 4 we explore the relationship between the main components of our decomposition and offshoring 
(OFFSH), R&D intensity, ICT and Chinese import penetration. We report the simple average of the change of 
employment and the change in within-sector polarization, the average level of offshoring intensity, ICT, R&D 
intensity and Chinese import penetration across all countries in the sample15. Since data on R&D intensity are 
unavailable for public sector industries, agriculture and mining, we only report statistics for non-agriculture and non-
mining private industries. The table shows that manufacturing is strongly integrated in GVCs (high OFFSH), 
experiences strong Chinese import competition and also has high R&D intensity. Chinese import competition and 
process innovation through R&D expenditure are relatively unimportant factors in non-manufacturing industries16. 
However, the level of ICT capital intensity varies substantially across non-manufacturing industries. The financial 
intermediation and the business service sector are particularly exposed to ICT-related technological change. 
 
Table 4: The link between offshoring, technology and Chinese import penetration with within-industry 
polarization change (over period 1997-2007) 
Industry ∆Polar ∆emp. OFFSH R&Dintensity ICT 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐶𝐻𝑁 
Construction 2.62 0.60 23.78 0.14 2.43 0.01 
Electricity, gas, water supply 10.14 -0.34 26.12 0.37 18.12 0.01 
Financial intermediation 8.99 -0.23 9.787 0.42 69.19 -0.08 
Hotels and restaurants -0.40 0.61 16.45 0.00 5.96 0.65 
Manufacturing 5.31 -4.26 36.40 4.89 8.77 0.60 
Real estate and business serv. 5.15 2.51 14.34 1.00 24.13 -0.15 
Transport and communication 3.35 -0.34 20.74 0.46 19.00 0.23 
Wholesale and retail trade 3.09 0.70 14.59 0.23 9.71 0.10 
                                                                    
12 It would also be of interest to look at service imports into specific industries as these could equally affect employment. 
However, we do not have the necessary data at our disposal to explore the relevance of this type of this phenomenon on 
polarization. 
13 We take the index of strictness of employment protection for temporary contracts. We have also experimented with the 
employment protection legislation for temporary and fixed contracts, but the results do not change qualitatively.  
14 The Kaitz index is constructed as the ratio of the minimum wage over the average wage in a country c at time t. The index is 
adjusted to reflect the absence of a federal minimum wage in several of the countries in the sample. We set the value of the 
index to zero when a formal minimum wage does not exist at any moment during year t.  
15 We no longer weight each observation according to the average employment level as in equation 1. 
16 Acemoglu et al. (2016) show that these industries are mostly indirectly exposed to Chinese import competition shocks through their 
industrial linkage with domestic manufacturing firms. 
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Note: Simple (unweighted) averages computed across all countries in the sample 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ELFS data 
 
3 Empirical framework and Results 
We first focus on within-industry polarization and then turn to polarization caused by the between-industry 
reallocation of labor. For each of these two types of polarization we first outline the empirical framework and then 
present our results. 
3.1 Within-industry polarization 
3.1.1 Empirical Framework 
We specify two reduced form equations that include these three forces, one focusing on the share of workers (N) 
in high-paid (h) relative to middle-paid (m) occupations, 
𝑁ℎ
𝑁𝑚
; and the second one aiming at the share of workers in 
low-paid (l) occupations to middle-paid (m) ones, 
𝑁𝑙
𝑁𝑚
. In this way we take into account that the within-industry 
polarization patterns have differed greatly at the high- and low-paying end of the labor market in line with our findings 
in section 2.2. We again order occupations according to average wage level in line with Goos et al. (2014). Through 
our specifications, we capture the observed within-industry polarization and correlate it to our indicators of 
technological change, offshoring and Chinese net imports17,18. Similar set-ups have been used by Autor and Dorn 
(2013), Oldenski (2014), Keller and Utar (2016) and others. Thus, we seek to estimate the following specifications 







= 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 ln 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼3 ln 𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦ict + 𝛼4 ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡






= 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 ln 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼3 ln 𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦ict + 𝛼4 ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐶𝐻𝑁 + 𝛼6𝑳𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑐 + 𝜂𝑖𝑐𝑡
           (5) 
With subscript 𝑖, 𝑐 and 𝑡 referring to industry, country and year, respectively. θic are country×industry fixed 
effects and 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡  and 𝜂𝑖𝑐𝑡 are the error terms. These specifications allow us to analyze how the employment structure 
within industries has on average been affected by the change in technology, import competition and offshoring. We 
expect that α2, α3, α4 and α5 (β2, β3, β4 and β5 respectively) have a positive effect on the share of high- (low-)paid 
occupations on average. The dependent variables and 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻; 𝐼𝐶𝑇 and 𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 are measured in logarithms, 
which facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients as they refer to elasticities. Our regression specifications will 
be augmented with indicators of labor market institutions, indicated by the vector L. 
By including all available sectors in one specification, we stand to lose a large fraction of underlying variation which 
in turn would make it more difficult to find any statistical relationships in the data. We therefore report results for a 
detailed subsample of manufacturing industries defined at the NACE rev.1.1 two-digit level, while the other 
                                                                    
17 In terms of equation 1, we try and explain the ∆Polar term and use the industry shares as weights. 
18  Our specifications suggests a straightforward link between the different regressors and the within-industry 
polarization dependent variables. However, rigidity in relative wages could interact with technological change and 
globalization to induce further job destruction for certain tasks. However, given the complexity of this issue we will not 
address it further here. 
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subsample consists of all non-manufacturing private industries defined at the NACE rev.1.1 one-digit level 
(excluding agriculture and mining). In section 2.2 we noted that polarization in manufacturing industries is almost 
entirely explained by within-sector polarization and that the sector has been highly exposed to the forces of 
technology and globalization. Given this difference in exposure between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
industries, a separate analysis for each group of industries is helpful in establishing whether the role of offshoring, 
Chinese import competition and technology differed between manufacturing industries and non-manufacturing 
industries. Each observation is weighted by the share of sector employment in total private employment. 
3.1.2 Within-industry Results 
We first estimate a specification without time fixed effects in columns (1) and (2) of table 5 to uncover the 
correlations in the data. Interestingly, both technology variables enter significantly thus indicating that both variables 
capture different aspects of technological change and are positively correlated with high-polarization in 
manufacturing industries. We do not find proof that involvement in GVCs through offshoring is linked to 
polarization. However, a one percentage point rise in Chinese net import competition is correlated with a 1.5 percent 
rise in high-paid employment polarization. The latter correlation shows that globalization has coincided with within-
industry polarization in manufacturing industries. We do not find empirical evidence that any of the three forces are 
associated with low-paid employment polarization, thus unveiling an asymmetry with which the forces affect 
employment polarization at the high and the low end of the pay-scale. One potential explanation for this asymmetry 
could be the discrepancy of within-industry low-paid employment polarization across European labor markets. We 
will explore this asymmetry across country groups in table 7. We also find that the effect of labor market institutions 
is not strongly correlated with polarization.  
In columns (3) and (4) we include a country-specific time trend in our specification. Given the structure of our 
data, the identification will now occur through industry-specific time variation that differs from the country trend. 
However, the accession of China to the WTO in 2001 triggered a rise in offshoring and Chinese imports, which any 
time trend will automatically capture. By including the trend we thus run the risk of being left with insufficient 
variation to identify our indicators of globalization19. The literature uses detailed industry level data to overcome this 
obstacle and ensure sufficient variation is available for proper identification. While our data offers the advantage of 
covering multiple countries, it comes at the price of having industry-level data at a more aggregated level. 
Nevertheless, we find that a rise in ICT capital services and Chinese net import penetration lead to an increase in 
high-paid employment polarization, but R&D intensity no longer show a statistically significant relationship. Hence, 
our results suggest that the effect of ICT-induced technological change and Chinese import competition on high-
paying employment polarization is more causal in nature. A ten percent increase in ICT-induced technological change 
causes a 1.28% increase in high-paid employment polarization, while a one percentage point increase in Chinese net 
import competition leads to a 1.2% rise in high-paid employment polarization. 
  
                                                                    
19 The use of linear interpolation to connect missing year data points of the offshoring measure also means that some variation allowing 
independent identification of the effect of offshoring on polarization is lost. 
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Table 5: Explaining within-industry polarization using manufacturing sector data (NACE two digit) in the 
period 1996 – 2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 top bottom top bottom 
OFFSH 0.357** 0.025 -0.075 -0.237 
 (0.155) (0.255) (0.135) (0.313) 
R&D intensity 0.092*** 0.056 0.029 -0.013 
 (0.022) (0.049) (0.027) (0.031) 
ICT 0.250*** 0.113 0.128** 0.003 
 (0.040) (0.094) (0.054) (0.077) 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁 0.015* 0.012 0.012** 0.017 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.010) 
Union Density 0.331 1.256   
 (0.697) (2.569)   
EPL 0.008 -0.008   
 (0.078) (0.160)   
Adjusted Kaitz index -0.073 0.311   
 (0.119) (0.249)   
Constant -2.639*** -2.801* -0.822 -1.243 
 (0.604) (1.330) (0.478) (1.035) 
Observations 1937 1932 2053 2048 
Industry×Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country×Year FEs No No Yes Yes 
   𝑅2 0.930 0.792 0.954 0.905 
Standard errors in parentheses
, ∗  
p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
Estimates based on manufacturing sectors (NACE two digit). Standard errors clustered at the country level. All variables 
are expressed in logs with the exception of the adjusted Kaitz index and labor union density. Observations are weighted. 
The dependent variable top is the ratio of high-paid employees over mid-paid employees. The dependent variable bottom 
is the ratio of low-paid employees over mid-paid employees. All results robust to excluding the petroleum and nuclear 
fuel industry. 
Table 3 showed how the manufacturing industry in the EU on average accounted for (100%*1.133/4.290=)26 
percent of overall within-industry polarization. Moreover, high-paid employment polarization was the major driver 
of manufacturing’s within-industry polarization. Given our estimates, we can thus analyze how ICT-induced 
technological change and Chinese net import competition contributed to overall within-industry polarization. We 
therefore use the significant estimates that we obtained in column (3) to make predictions on the estimated high-paid 
within-industry polarization. In Figure 3, we report our estimates as a relative fraction of overall observed high-paid 
employment polarization within manufacturing20. Our predictions explain on average around 37 percent of overall 
within-industry polarization observed in the EU. However, the estimates strongly vary across countries, explaining 
for instance only 5 percent of high-paid employment polarization in Slovenian manufacturing industries while 
explaining 76 percent of the same type of polarization for German manufacturing industries. A common factor across 
all countries is the dominant role of ICT induced technical change, which explains on average around 33 percent of 
                                                                    
20 We exclude countries where data on ICT or Chinese net import competition was missing in the beginning or end year. 
Additionally, Hungary, Czech Republic and the Netherlands report very low numbers of high-paid within-industry polarization 
in manufacturing. Consequently, our estimates predict around 2 times as much high-paid employment polarization within 
manufacturing industries than effectively observed. Therefore, these countries were also discarded. We address the issue of 
heterogeneity across countries later in this section. 
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the high-paid employment polarization in manufacturing, while Chinese net import competition accounts for the 
other 4 percent. Hence, high-paid employment polarization has been predominantly driven by ICT adoption. 
 
Next, we turn our attention to the other subsample of non-manufacturing private sectors in our data21. The results 
for this subsample are reported in table 6. We proceed as before and first estimate a regression equation showing 
simple correlations before controlling for a country specific time trend. Our results in columns (1) and (2) indicate 
that the GVC involvement of an industry is correlated with a rise in low-paid employment polarization. However, 
the results suggest that offshoring is not linked with a rise in high-paid employment polarization. This again points 
towards an asymmetric relation between the three forces and low-paid and high-paid employment polarization. We 
also find that a rise in the ICT intensity of an industry leads to a rise in both high-paid and low-paid employment 
polarization. There is no statistical association between Chinese import competition and low-paid employment 
polarization, likely because the non-manufacturing industries are less exposed to Chinese import competition. 
However, note here that non-manufacturing industries could be indirectly affected by Chinese import competition 
through their industrial links with manufacturing industries (Acemoglu et al., 2016). We explore this possibility in a 
robustness check22. In columns (3) and (4) we include a more conservative estimation strategy with country×year 




                                                                    
21 The private sectors included in the sample are the NACE rev. 1.1 one digit sectors electricity, gas and water supply; construction; 
wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communication; financial intermediation; real estate, 
renting and business activities. We thus exclude agriculture and mining from the analysis. 
22 Similarly, technological shocks could equally reverberate from manufacturing to non-manufacturing industries, although we do not 
examine this possibility any further here. 
Figure 3: Fraction of country-level high-paid employment polarization within 
manufacturing explained by ICT and Chinese net import competition (1998-2007) 
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Table 6: Explaining within-industry polarization using broad sector non-manufacturing data (NACE one digit) 
in the period 1996 - 2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 top bottom top bottom 
OFFSH 0.256 0.286** 0.011 0.308 
 (0.156) (0.105) (0.197) (0.253) 
R&D intensity -0.008 -0.021* -0.007 0.014 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) 
ICT 0.185*** 0.133*** -0.049 0.008 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.105) (0.127) 
Net Imp.penCHN 0.040 0.070 -0.016 0.084 
 (0.048) (0.043) (0.050) (0.063) 
Union Density -0.439 0.977   
 (0.952) (0.648)   
EPL 0.047 0.043   
 (0.048) (0.029)   
Adjusted Kaitz Index 0.092 0.196   
 (0.156) (0.160)   
Constant -1.214 -2.205*** -0.492 -1.605** 
 (0.745) (0.432) (0.606) (0.710) 
Observations 892 892 919 919 
Industry×Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country×Year FEs No No Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.977 0.985 0.989 0.989 
Standard errors in parentheses
  ∗  p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Estimates based on non-manufacturing private sectors (NACE one digit) excluding agriculture and mining industries. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level. All variables are expressed in logs with the exception of the adjusted Kaitz 
index and labor union density. Observations are weighted. The dependent variable top is the ratio of high-paid employees 
over mid-paid employees. The dependent variable bottom is the ratio of low-paid employees over mid-paid employees. 
The results in tables 5 and 6 show the merit of splitting our sample into a manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
subsample. The manufacturing industries have experienced a distinct type of exposure to the different technological 
and globalization forces compared to non-manufacturing industries. Chinese import competition and process 
innovation through changes in ICT and R&D intensity were associated with within-industry polarization in 
manufacturing industries. In the case of ICT induced technological change and Chinese net import competition we 
can state with a sufficient degree of certainty that these relations are causal, while this is less clear for the other 
factors. Given the diverse nature of industries included in the group of non-manufacturing industries, it is likely that 
the exposure to globalization and the adoption of new technology could still have had idiosyncratic effects on certain 
industries in this group. However, we lack sufficient detail to explore this issue at depth. 
In table 7 we relax the assumption that the effects that globalization and technological change have, are of 
common nature and size across all countries in our sample. Differences in industrial structure, favorable economic 
headwinds through further integration with the rest of the European economy and institutional differences across 
countries may have meant that the employment polarization, though common across all economies, might be 
differently associated with offshoring, import competition and technology depending on the group of countries one 
is analyzing. Indeed, Figure 3 showed substantial divergence across countries in the level of within-industry 
polarization for both high- and low-paid employment polarization. Therefore, we construct several country group 
dummies for Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries, Central-European countries and Southern-European 
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countries and interact these with the different globalization and technology indicators. As a reference group we use 
the Western-European economies so that the interaction of the geographical dummy with the different globalization 
and technology indicators reflects the difference in effect for that country group relative to Western-European 
economies. As we have thus far not found proof that labor market institutions were truly relevant in affecting within-
industry polarization, we have dropped these measures from our specification. 
Our findings confirm our previous conclusion that ICT induced technological change is associated with high-paid 
employment polarization in manufacturing industries. Moreover, in manufacturing industries there is some evidence 
that the size of the effect differs across country groups. In Central- and Southern-European countries the correlation 
between ICT intensity and high-paying employment polarization is often weaker, although this difference is not 
robust to the inclusion of a country-specific time trend. In the case of R&D the outcome appears to be particularly 
sensitive to the inclusion of a time trend raising doubts on the robustness of this measure of process innovation. We 
will therefore present robustness checks later on to explore this type of process innovation using an alternative 
definition of process innovation. Interestingly, when accounting for geographical differences we find that Chinese 
net import competition now switches its impact from high- to low-paid employment polarization. Furthermore, 
Chinese competition has contributed to increased low-paid within-industry employment polarization in all advanced 
country groups except in Central and Southern European countries. The same geographical pattern was found also 
for the impact of ICT- and R&D-induced technological change. This is consistent with Figure 3 showing that low-
paid within-industry employment polarization in all Central and Southern European countries actually decreased over 
the period 1997-2007. This implies that in this period the middle-paid employment shares in these two country groups 
were strengthened. One explanation for this is increased manufacturing FDI flows to Central and Southern European 
countries in this period seeking lower labor cost of routine jobs. In other words, the potential trends of increased low-
paid employment polarization in Central and Southern European countries might have been offset by the inflow of 
FDI into manufacturing industries. It thus seems that increased either low- or high-paying (or both) within-industry 
employment polarization in manufacturing sectors of Western countries can be largely explained by the impact of 
technology (R&D- and ICT-induced) and globalization (Chinese competition), but less so in other European regions. 
In non-manufacturing sectors we find some evidence on the impact of technology (but only ICT-induced) and 
China-driven globalization on increased within-industry employment polarization in low-paying jobs, whereby these 
effects are significantly lower in Central and Southern European countries. These effects largely disappear when 
controlling for country×year fixed effects. 
In addition, in an attempt to explain how the same shocks can have different effects on within-industry 
polarization, table B1 and B2 of appendix B analyze how interactions of the labor market institutions and 
globalization and technological change are related to polarization. There is some indication that in countries with 
strong institutions Chinese net import competition led to more high-paying employment polarization in 
manufacturing industries, while offshoring led to more low-paying employment polarization. The results in table B1 
would suggest this is mostly driven by Union density. However, the strongly institutionalized countries are less 
sensitive to the effects of ICT induced technological change on low-employment polarization. This could explain 
why three of the countries (Belgium, Italy and Slovenia) that according to our definition are highly institutionalized 
incurred strong within-industry high-paying employment polarization combined with a decline in low-paying 
employment. However, other countries with weaker institutions have shown similar trends making the role of labor 
market institutions less clear. It is more likely that the varying nature of the results in table B1 and B2 point towards 
other underlying factors that are determining how sensitive industries are to within-industry polarization. Hence, 
industries in different countries seem to show differing degrees of sensitivity to globalization and technological forces 
independent of the type of labor market institutions these countries have. 
 
Table 7: Explaining within-industry polarization in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in the period 1996 - 2007: 




































SStandard errors in parentheses
, ∗  p < 0.10, ∗ ∗  p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗  p < 0.01 
Estimates based on manufacturing (NACE two digit) sectors in columns (1) to (4) and non-manufacturing (NACE one digit) sectors excluding agriculture and mining in columns (5) 
to (8). Standard errors clustered at the country level. Observations are weighted. Countries in our sample are divided into four different geographic groups: Scandinavian and Anglo-
Saxon countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and Ireland), core Western-European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands), 
Southern-European countries (Spain and Italy) and Central-European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia). 
          
 Manufacturing  Non-manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Top Bottom Top Bottom  Top Bottom Top Bottom 
OFFSH 0.258 0.317 -0.288** -0.372  0.021 0.088 -0.332 0.052 
OFFSH*Scand.&A-Saxon 0.062 -0.413 0.277 0.242  0.259 -0.260 0.568 0.226 
OFFSH*Central Europe 0.487 -0.746 0.676* 0.541  -0.553 0.107 -0.203 0.322 
OFFSH*Southern Europe 0.493 0.228 0.097 0.812  0.632 0.326 0.628 0.495 
R&D intensity 0.085** 0.289*** -0.062* -0.014  0.028 -0.022 0.002 -0.011 
R&D*Scand.&A-Saxon -0.008 -0.327** 0.108 -0.026  -0.040 0.026 -0.017 0.046* 
R&D*Central Europe -0.022 -0.264** 0.102* -0.007  -0.041 0.022 -0.012 0.011 
R&D*Southern Europe 0.069 -0.204** 0.164*** 0.078  -0.026 0.051** 0.004 0.040 
ICT 0.321*** 0.278 0.199*** 0.071  0.243*** 0.125*** -0.126 -0.074 
ICT*Scand.&A-Saxon -0.096 -0.125 -0.089 -0.111  -0.007 0.163** 0.149 0.332 
ICT*Central Europe -0.267** -0.646* -0.170 -0.152  -0.087 -0.139*** 0.115 0.504*** 
ICT*Southern Europe -0.148 -0.444** -0.034 0.024  -0.162* -0.240** 0.064 -0.093 
Imp.penCHN 0.013 0.016** 0.011 0.018  0.121 0.158*** -0.047 0.142 
Imp.penCHN*Scand.&A-Saxon 0.021 0.048 0.012 0.023  -0.062 -0.033 0.103 0.004 
Imp.penCHN*Central Europe -0.018 -0.046** -0.015* -0.037**  -0.216** -0.290 -0.093 -0.211 
Imp.penCHN*Southern Europe 0.010 -0.024*** 0.010 -0.006  -0.210** -0.156*** -0.077 -0.146 
Constant -2.756*** -2.405*** -0.921** -1.797**  -0.925** -1.144*** -0.173 -1.77*** 
N 2053 2048 2053 2048  919 919 919 919 
  Industry× country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country×Year FEs No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.932 0.819 0.955 0.906  0.977 0.986 0.989 0.989 
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We now discuss several robustness checks that we have performed and which we present in appendix 
B. From table 7 it has emerged that R&D intensity is particularly sensitive to the chosen specification 
and the effects are not robust to the inclusion of a reasonable time trend. A possible comment to the use 
of R&D intensity as an indicator of technological change is that it measures technology input and 
therefore does not necessarily capture technological output and, hence, technological change. We 
perform a robustness check to test a specification using a variable that also reflects process innovation 
but that is more closely related to technological output. In particular, we use the number of patents per 
employee in the industry collected from EUROSTAT as a proxy for technological change. Given the 
limited relevance of R&D to non-manufacturing industries, we limit our robustness check to 
manufacturing industries. Table B3 reports the results. While the sign of the patent variable shows a 
positive statistical relation between technological change and high-paid within-industry polarization in 
manufacturing, it is never close to significance. ICT remains robustly estimated for high-paid 
employment polarization.  
We have used net import competition to look at the net impact of the emergence of China on within-
industry polarization. In table B4 we split net import penetration in an import and an export term and 
analyze its effects on manufacturing within-industry polarization. The results indicate that import 
competition increased polarization within an industry, while new export opportunities offset this effect. 
However, both variables are not significant at the conventional levels. Next, we turn to the non-
manufacturing industries. The non-tradable nature of the output of several non-manufacturing industries 
and the limited increase in Chinese services imports have meant that non-manufacturing EU industries 
have generally not faced direct Chinese import competition. However, several of these industries are 
indirectly exposed to a Chinese import penetration shock as they provide services that are used as an 
input by the manufacturing industries. Hence, the demise of manufacturing industries at the hands of 
manufacturing imports from China leaves non-manufacturing industries exposed through their industrial 
links with manufacturing industries (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2015). The construction of 
our downstream exposure measure is discussed in appendix B. The industrial links between the industries 
are derived from the WIOD I/O-tables (Timmer et al., 2015). In table B5 we show that even when we 
account for these downstream links we do not find that Chinese net import competition affected within-
industry polarization in non-manufacturing industries.   
3.2 Between-industry polarization 
3.2.1 Empirical framework 
Section 2.2. showed that a substantial fraction of overall polarization is accounted for by the 
reallocation of employment between industries within the broader economy. To understand the role of 
GVCs, import competition and technology in overall polarization, we require an additional specification 
that relates changes in the employment of industries in the economy to these factors. The empirical 
approach of Acemoglu et al. (2016) offers a useful framework that analyzes the effect of Chinese import 
competition on employment. We compute the change in GVC participation (as a proxy for offshoring), 
import competition of China and R&D intensity over one long pre-crisis period and over a smaller post-
crisis period23. Subsequently, we perform the analysis using two separate specifications: one where we 
exclusively consider the long pre-crisis period and one where we consider both the pre- and the post-
                                                                    
23 The structural break in the data in 2008 caused by a change in the NACE industry classification is circumvented 




crisis periods. The specification where we exclusively use the long pre-crisis period is of the following 
form24: 
Δ ln𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2Δ𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾3Δ𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾4Δ ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾5ΔNet 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐶𝐻𝑁 +
𝛿𝑐 + 𝜔𝑖𝑐𝑡         (6) 
∆ln Empict is 100 times the log change in the employment of an industry. δc is a country fixed effect 
included to control for a general country employment trend. By controlling for the country fixed effects 
we concentrate on growth differentials between industries within the countries. We replace the country 
fixed effect with a country×period fixed effect, 𝛿𝑐𝑡, when considering both the pre- and the post-crisis 
period so we control for the country-specific severity of the crisis. Since we have no data on ICT after 
2007, this indicator of technological change was excluded from any analysis that included the crisis 
period. Each observation is weighted with the beginning of period employment share in national 
employment. In equation (4) we multiplied ΔNet 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛  by 100 for ease of interpretation of our 
regression output. We now do the same for Δ𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 and Δ𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻 so that these represent 100 
times the level changes in the R&D Intensity of the industry and the offshoring ratio, respectively. 
Δ ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇 is 100 times the log changes in ICT usage in the industry.  
While the above equation will show how employment was affected by the different shocks that have 
hit the labor market, it is not directly linked with polarization. Therefore, we also present results of a 
specification where we interact all the independent variables with an indicator that is equal to one when 
a specific industry is above or below the median level of polarization in 1998. Reallocation could then 
have occurred if initially lowly polarized industries were harder hit by the different shocks, while initially 
highly polarized industries were left largely unaffected by the shocks. 
Our estimates might be subject to concerns of endogeneity as reported by Autor et al. (2013) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2016). This issue could be particularly severe in our specification since our sample 
includes several countries. If the country and the country×time fixed effects are unable to properly control 
for local demand effects, the Chinese import competition coefficient will be upwardly biased since a 
demand boom will raise both employment and imports in some sectors. Given that there are several 
countries in our sample which have undergone such demand-driven booms, the issue is likely pervasive. 
Therefore, we limit our between-industry analysis to basic specifications and leave a more rigorous 
approach to future research.  
3.2.2 Results 
We first look at the results for manufacturing industries in table 8 and then analyze the same 





                                                                    
24 In terms of equation 1 we explain the changes in the employment shares, Δ𝑆𝑖,𝑐,  by investigating the relationship 




Table 8: Explaining employment growth in manufacturing industries in the period 1998 - 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻 0.648 0.236 -0.807 -0.778 
 
(1.017) (0.683) (0.516) (0.708) 
Δ𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.224 -0.661 0.784 -0.695 
 (1.337) (1.066) (2.221) (3.036) 
Δ ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇 -0.057  -0.030  
 (0.076)  (0.091)  
Δ𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁 -3.156*** -2.413*** -6.441*** -5.912*** 
 (1.029) (0.623) (1.000) (0.818) 
Δ𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻 ×highly polarized   2.597** 1.646** 
   (0.655) (0.702) 
Δ𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦×highly polarized   -2.816 -1.255 
   (2.282) (3.259) 
Δ ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇×highly polarized   0.114  
   (0.071)  
Δ𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁×highly polarized   7.18*** 6.809*** 
   (1.505) (1.289) 
Highly polarized   -17.246* -6.783* 
   (9.013) (3.344) 
Constant 2.179 -2.647*** 4.760* 7.641** 
 (8.984) (2.890) (11.412) (3.138) 
  N 139 345 139 345 
Country FEs Yes No Yes No 
Country×period FEs No Yes No Yes 
𝑅2 0.36 0.25 0.58 0.39 
 
Estimates based on manufacturing (NACE two-digit) sectors. Standard errors clustered at the country level. 
Δ𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻, Δ𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦, Δ ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇 and Δ𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁  have all been multiplied by 100 to facilitate the 
interpretation. Observations are weighted by beginning of period employment share in national employment. The 
dependent variable is 100 times  the change in the log of employment. Petroleum and nuclear fuel industry is 
excluded from the analysis. Highly Polarized is a dummy equal to one when the initial polarization rate of the 
industry is above the median polarization rate observed across all manufacturing industries in the relevant country. 
Column (1) and (3): Long differences from 1998 to 2007. 
Column (2) and (4): Stacked differences from 1998 to 2007 and 2008 to 2010. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results in columns (1) and (2) show that only Chinese import penetration is significantly correlated 
with employment growth by sectors, while offshoring and technology do not seem to contribute to employment 
changes. Specifically, a change in the net Chinese import penetration ratio by one percentage point is 
significantly correlated with a decrease of employment in manufacturing industries by 2.41 to 3.16 percent. To 
gauge the economic significance of these results, we use the estimates in column (2) and compute the estimated 
employment decline that took place in manufacturing for each individual country from 1998 to 2010. When 
we weight these employment declines according to the initial employment share, we find that 21 percent of the 
total decline in manufacturing employment in Europe has resulted from Chinese net import competition. This 
implies a loss of 944,000 employees in manufacturing across the EU. Acemoglu et al. (2016) find that in the 
U.S. the direct impact of Chinese import competition amounted to around 10 percent of the observed 
employment decline in manufacturing. Hence, this shows how Chinese net import competition has induced 
employment declines in relatively lowly polarized manufacturing industries across Europe. Interestingly, when 
interacting our main explanatory variables with the degree of initial sector’s labor polarization, the results in 
columns (3) and (4) show that initially highly polarized industries were less sensitive to the Chinese net import 
penetration shock. The same is true for offshoring. Conversely, industries that were polarized below the median 
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polarization rate of manufacturing industries in a country were more severely affected by the Chinese net import 
penetration shock and offshoring. However, this effect is offset by the fact that simply being initially highly 
polarized is linked with employment decline in those industries25.  
Our decomposition has shown that polarization is mostly a result of the reallocation of labor away from 
manufacturing industries towards service industries rather than the reallocation of labor between manufacturing 
industries. Therefore, it is particularly important to analyze whether highly polarized non-manufacturing 
industries have experienced employment increases.  
We therefore move on to results for the non-manufacturing industries (Table 9). In column (1) there is some 
evidence that R&D induced technological change led to an increase in employment. However, this finding is 
not robust across all specifications. In columns (5) and (6) we account for the indirect exposure of non-
manufacturing industries to the Chinese net import penetration shock that affected manufacturing industries. 
Acemoglu et al. (2016) showed that this indirect shock that occurred downstream in the production chain 
affected employment in these industries. In column (6) we find evidence corroborating this finding. 
Specifically, our results indicate that a net import penetration shock of one percentage point in all downstream 
manufacturing industries leads to an employment decline of 26.54 percent in the non-manufacturing industries. 
Meanwhile, the effect was non-existent in highly polarized non-manufacturing industries. As this estimate is 
four times larger than the one found by Acemoglu et al. (2016) for U.S. industries and is only significant when 
the crisis period is included, caution is clearly warranted as there is an endogeneity bias affecting the estimates. 
Hence, we only consider this as tentative evidence. We also find that initially highly polarized non-
manufacturing industries in European countries saw employment increases in line with what one would expect 
given the reallocation of labor towards more polarizing industries. Again, this coefficient is only significant 










                                                                    
25 In a separate analysis (not reported here) we decompose the net import penetration shock into an export and 
an import component. As expected, export penetration to China increased industry employment while import 
penetration decreased it. Remarkably, depending on the specification export penetration had a coefficient up to four 
times as large as the one on import penetration. As on average import competition shocks were around double the 
size of export penetration shocks, this will have meant that in several industries across the EU new export 




Table 9: Explaining employment growth in broad non-manufacturing sectors in the period 1998 - 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻 -0.790 -2.819* -0.772 -2.346 -0.684 -1.828 
 
(1.508) (1.378) (1.547) (1.663) (1.449) (1.546) 
Δ𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 36.061** 10.674 31.069 25.439 26.509 23.592 
 (14.29) (13.208) (26.107) (17.803) (24.831) (17.873) 
Δ ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇 0.156  0.140  0.144  
 (0.104)  (0.105)  (0.129)  
Δ𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁 -2.211 1.048 9.700 0.555 14.705 1.975 
 (9.575) (1.846) (10.650) (2.875) (13.134) (3.528) 
ΔIndirect Net Imp. penCHN     -30.625 -26.541* 
     (32.078) (13.084) 
Δ𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻 ×highly polarized   -1.747 -1.020 -1.290 -1.365 
   (2.269) (1.510) (2.419) (1.405) 
Δ𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦×highly polarized   -3.706 -25.794 1.564 -23.038 
   (28.820) (19.045) (27.935) (19.109) 
Δ ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇×highly polarized   -0.118  -0.109  
   (0.270)  (0.289)  
Δ𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁×highly polarized     -33.282 0.088 
     (30.020) (3.210) 
ΔInd.𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁×highly 
polarized 
  
-28.732 0.830 36.339 24.897*** 
   (25.495) (2.669) (30.660) (10.016) 
Highly polarized   26.033 15.272*** 18.290 14.501*** 
   (30.508) (4.032) (35.882) (4.189) 
Constant -15.664 68.770*** -15.098 84.471*** -14.738 88.408 
 (13.170) (19.246) (11.022) (27.550) (9.723) (26.329) 
  N 59 146 59 146 59 146 
Country FEs Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Country×period FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes 
𝑅2 0.49 0.44 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.60 
 
Notes: Estimates based on non-manufacturing (NACE one-digit) sectors. Standard errors clustered at the country 
level. Δ𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻, Δ𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦, Δ ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇 and Δ𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁 have all been multiplied by 100 to facilitate 
the interpretation. Observations are weighted by beginning of period employment share in national employment. 
The dependent variable is the 100 times the change in the log of employment. Highly Polarized is a dummy equal 
to one when the initial polarization rate of the industry is above the median polarization rate observed across all 
non-manufacturing industries in the relevant country. 
Column (1), (3) and (5): Long differences from 1998 to 2007. 
Column (2), (4) and (6): Stacked differences from 1998 to 2007 and 2008 to 2010. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.3 Discussion 
A recent spate of studies exploring polarization using firm-level data have found evidence of ICT or 
technology adoption leading to increased polarization (Harrigan et al., 2016; Heyman, 2016; Kerr et al., 2016; 
Böckerman et al., 2016). Our analysis shows that the conclusions of these firm-level studies also emerge in a 
more aggregated sample and are not limited to a limited number of countries but are more general across 
different countries. Our results suggest that ICT adoption was the predominant driving factor behind the 
relative increase of high-paid employment in manufacturing industries. This is consistent with theoretical 
models, such as Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and others, where the trigger is labor augmenting technological 
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progress benefiting the high-skilled tasks, at the expense of middle-skilled tasks. During the time period we 
consider in our analysis, we witness strong changes in ICT capital services per hour worked. In both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries ICT capital services have doubled over the time period of our 
analysis. 
Our results also underline the relevance of Chinese import competition in aggregate polarization. Again, 
our results are in line with micro-evidence in the literature. Keller and Utar (2016) use Danish employer-
employee matched data and find that Chinese import competition explained about a fifth of the overall mid-
wage employment decline. Moreover, they also found that Chinese import competition induced restructuring 
of employment away from manufacturing towards low-wage services. We find some evidence that Chinese net 
import competition induced high-paying employment polarization within manufacturing industries. However, 
our results show that Chinese import competition did not affect within-industry polarization in all countries 
equally, but affected only core Western, Scandinavian & Anglo-Saxon EU countries. Chinese import 
competition was particularly relevant in explaining employment shifts towards more polarized industries. We 
find tentative evidence that non-manufacturing industries that supply manufacturing industries facing Chinese 
import competition suffered stronger employment declines when the industry was initially less polarized. This 
evidence suggests that aside from the general impact Chinese import competition had on employment 
(Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2013, Balsvik, 2013; Dauth et al., 2014; Donoso et al., 2014), the role it 
played in restructuring employment in the labor market also increased aggregate polarization. Our analysis 
thus suggests that while ICT adoption and Chinese import competition both contributed to aggregate 
polarization, they did so in diverse ways. 
We find that there is considerable heterogeneity in the level of polarization across the different countries. 
Moreover, the way in which polarization has manifested itself across countries, with varying degrees of within- 
industry polarization and employment reallocation between industries, makes it important to find out what is 
driving these diverse patterns. While labor market institutions differ considerably within the panel of countries 
we consider, we have not found outspoken evidence that these institutions affected polarization. One likely 
explanation is that other underlying country-specific shocks might have aggravated the already existing pattern 
of polarization and induced the cross-country heterogeneity in polarization patterns that we observe. For 
instance, Nickell et al. (2008) noted that the different pace of deindustrialization across (OECD) countries, 
which we have found to be tied to the phenomenon of employment polarization, can be explained by 
differential changes in relative prices of manufacturing and non-manufacturing goods and productivity growth. 
Hence, such factors will have contributed both directly and indirectly in generating the cross-country 




This paper has examined how employment polarization is associated with the forces of technological change, 
offshoring and import competition in European economies. We show that aggregate polarization is a result of 
high and low paying employment increasing within individual industries as well as the reallocation of labor 
away from industries with low polarization such as manufacturing towards industries with relatively high 
polarization such as the service industries. We find that both aspects of polarization were affected differently 
by technological change and globalization. 
 
ICT adoption explains around a third of high paying employment polarization within individual manufacturing 
industries, while Chinese net import competition also contributed to this phenomenon but only explains a very 
small fraction. Low-paying employment polarization within industries varied greatly across countries and our 
results do not indicate that there is a clear link between this type of polarization and the globalization and 
technology shocks. To understand the polarization that has occurred as a result of the reallocation of 
employment from less polarized to more polarized industries, we have analyzed the relation between 
globalization and technological change, on the one hand, and employment growth in the industries. We found 
that Chinese net import penetration accounts for about a fifth of employment losses in lowly polarized 
manufacturing industries. However, we find no proof that technological change played any role in this 
reallocation of labor.  
 
This paper offers several interesting pathways for future research and some policy prescriptions. First, we have 
demonstrated that different forces will affect labor markets in countries in distinct ways. To formulate a 
guideline for policy it is necessary to determine what characteristics of the labor market cause these divergent 
reactions. In this respect, this paper has shown that differences between countries in labor market institutions 
are not a sufficient explanation. However, future research will have to focus on these country-specific factors 
and their interaction with the drivers of polarization to be able to provide relevant policy prescriptions. The 
widespread nature of polarization does suggest that there is a clear necessity for the use of policy instruments 
to smooth the process of transition for workers. Second, we have chosen to study within- and between-industry 
polarization as two complementary processes. However, we have not addressed how both these processes are 
directly related. To understand how any outside force can lead to overall polarization, both types of polarization 
need to be considered in conjunction. Finally, throughout this paper we have considered the forces of 
technology and globalization as unrelated shocks influencing the polarization process. Nevertheless, all these 
factors are entangled so that a change in one factor directly affects the other. Disentangling these effects is 
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A Summary statistics and graphs 
A.1 Offshoring 
Table A1: Offshoring measure: Initial levels and evolution 
from 1995 to 2007 at the country 
level 
Country OFFSH in 1995 Change from 1995 to 2007 
Ireland 38.5 4.59 
Slovenia 32.3 4.45 
Slovakia 31.9 14.85 
Belgium 31.1 3.74 
Czech Republic 30.5 11.92 
Hungary 30.1 16.83 
Portugal 27.4 5.77 
Sweden 26.3 4.84 
Finland 24.1 8.92 
Netherlands 23.2 -3.99 
Denmark 23.1 8.82 
Austria 21.5 6.08 
Spain 19.2 7.99 
Great-Britain 18.3 0.47 
France 17.3 7.04 
Italy 17.2 7.31 
Greece 16.3 7.71 
Germany 14.9 8.77 
Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2016) 
A.2 Chinese import competition 
Figure A1: Change in Chinese import penetration 1995-2007 





A.3 Summary statistics of regression samples 
Table A2: Summary statistics for variables included in within-sector polarization regressions 
 NACE two-digit Manufacturing sectors 
 Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
top 1937 -1.01 0.71 -4.13 1.07 
bottom 1932 -2.02 0.69 -4.48 -0.12 
ln OFFSH 1937 3.41 0.33 2.54 4.27 
ln R&D Intensity 1937 0.55 1.52 -8.01 4.43 
ln ICT 1937 0.96 1.55 -2.87 7.36 
Net Imp.penCHN 1937 0.72 2.66 -9.62 19.21 
Union Density 1937 0.36 0.22 0.08 0.81 
EPL 1937 0.28 0.80 -1.39 1.56 
Adjusted Kaitz Index 1937 0.21 0.20 0 0.59 
 
 NACE one-digit non-Manufacturing sectors 
 Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
top 809 -0.30 0.91 -2.79 2.22 
bottom 809 -1.21 1.39 -4.23 2.99 
ln OFFSH 809 2.77 0.51 1.39 4.01 
ln R&D Intensity 809 -1.55 1.59 -8.64 1.05 
ln ICT 809 -1.78 1.52 -2.63 6.86 
Net Imp.penCHN 809    0.04 0.34 -1.87 2.89 
Union Density 809 0.36 0.21 0.08 0.81 
EPL 809 0.31 0.74 -1.39 1.58 
Adjusted Kaitz Index 809 0.21 0.20 0 0.59 
Summary statistics based on observations included in the regressions of column (5) of 
table 5 (for broad NACE one-digit industries) and column (5) of table 6 (for 
manufacturing NACE two-digit industries). 
 
Table A3: Summary statistics for variables included in between-industry 
reallocation regressions 
 NACE two-digit Manufacturing sectors 
 Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Δ ln 𝑒𝑚𝑝 139 -5.5 28.99 -101.07 52.59 
ΔOFFSH 139 3.03 4.11 -10.32 15.16 
ΔR&DIntensity 139 0.59 2.06 -8.17 8.83 
Δln ICT 139 88.18 39.52 -1.16 206.97 
ΔNet Imp. penCHN 139 1.64 3.63 -4.87 15.21 
   
 NACE one-digit non-Manufacturing sectors 
 Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Δ ln 𝑒𝑚𝑝 51 13.81 30.84 -58.43 85.47 
ΔOFFSH 51 2.19 4.30 -9.69 13.10 
ΔR&DIntensity 51 0.01 0.42 -1.33 1.01 
Δln ICT 51 83.94 36.98 -21.83 175.01 
ΔNet Imp. penCHN 51 0.03 0.30 -0.63 1.13 
ΔIndirect Net Imp. penCHN 51 0.24 0.27 -0.07 1.43 
Summary statistics based on observations included in the regressions of column (1) (for broad 
NACE one-digit industries) (for manufacturing NACE two-digit industries) of table 8 and 9. 
Δ𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻 , Δ𝑅&𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦  and import penetration measures all expressed in percentage 
points rather than fractions. Δ ln 𝐼𝐶𝑇 and Δ ln 𝑒𝑚𝑝 were multiplied by 100. 
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B Additional robustness checks 
B.1 Construction downstream exposure measure 
We use the methodology of Acemoglu et al. (2015) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) to construct the indirect 
exposure to downstream Chinese import penetration shocks. We start by aggregating some industries in the 
WIOD yearly input/output-tables so that the definition of the industries complies with the one used in our 




          (7) 
These coefficients capture how important the sales from industry i to industry j are relative to the total 
output of industry i. As the increase in Chinese imports of industry j goods diminish demand for goods of the 
domestic industry j, domestic industry j will in turn reduce its demand of inputs from industry i. The greater is 
the importance of industry j in overall output of industry i, the more a shock of industry j is propagated to 
industry i. However, the reduction in demand for industry j goods might also trigger a decrease in demand for 
inputs from other industries to which industry i in turn provides inputs. Therefore, a reduction in demand for a 
downstream industry can trigger both direct and indirect reductions in demand for industry i output. We use 
the Leontief inverse element 𝑎𝑖?̂?
−1 to capture all direct and indirect effects on the output of industry i of a 
reduction in output of industry j. Next, we compute the indirect exposure of an industry i to a Chinese import 
penetration shock as follows: 
    
𝐼𝑛𝑑.𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡











                  (8) 
Where industry i is a domestic non-manufacturing industry and industries j ∈ J are domestic manufacturing 
industries. The indirect exposure of a non-manufacturing industry is thus equal to the sum of the indirect 
exposures to Chinese import penetration of each individual manufacturing industry. We use the Leontief 
inverse element at moment t−1 as this has not been affected by the shock in year t. 
 
B.2 Additional results 
In table B1 we show the results of interacting OFFSH and Chinese import competition with measures 
of labor market institutions, such as Union Density, EPL and Minimum Wages. We only analyze 
specifications without time trend as the labor market institution variables vary at the country-year level. 
When we account for potential interactions between labor market institutions and each of the different 
forces affecting employment, the table shows that there are some interactions that turn up significant. 
High labor union density and employment protection legislation in manufacturing industries that are 
highly exposed to the force of globalization are associated with more high-paid employment polarization. 
In non-manufacturing industries we find that higher minimum wages mitigate low-paid job polarization 
in industries more exposed to Chinese import penetration. Despite these significant interactions, it stands 
out that generally the interactions are not statistically significant showing that the effects are overall weak. 
 
As an additional robustness check into the relevance of labor market institutions for within-industry 
polarization we construct an institutional dummy that is equal to one for those countries that satisfy three 
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criteria: above median union density, above median employment protection and, finally, above median 
centralization of wage bargaining26. The rele vant countries are Belgium, Finland, Italy and Slovenia. 
The institutional dummy is subsequently interacted with the globalization and technology forces. In this 
way, we wish to test whether those countries with strong labor market institutions show larger association 
of globalization and technological change with polarization. Results are presented in table B2. We see 
that the interactions are generally not significant. Only for low-paid employment polarization in 
manufacturing industries do we find significant results. However, the two significant interactions have 
opposite signs, indicating that these are likely capturing other factors. 
 
 
Table B1: Explaining polarization within-industry polarization in the period 1996 - 2007: Interaction of 
offshoring measure and Chinese import penetration with labor market institutions 
 
 Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
OFFSH -0.06 -0.48 -0.00 0.03 
R&D intensity 0.09*** 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
ICT 0.24*** 0.10 0.18*** 0.11*** 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁 -0.02 -0.06 0.16 -0.02 
Union Density -3.43* -4.29 -1.93 -1.76 
OFFSH×Union Density 1.14* 1.68 0.55 0.91** 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁×Union Density 0.08** 0.16* -0.07 0.18 
EPL -0.45 -0.54 0.00 0.21 
OFFSH×EPL 0.14 0.16 0.02 -0.06 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁×EPL 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 0.07 
Adjusted Kaitz index -0.50 0.75 -0.44 0.53 
OFFSH×Adjusted Kaitz index 0.13 -0.13 0.19 -0.09 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁×Adjusted Kaitz 
Index 
0.04 0.12* -0.30 -0.06 
Constant -1.24 -1.14 -0.53 -1.42* 
N 1937 1932 892 892 
Industry×country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country×year FEs No No No No 
𝑅2 0.932 0.798 0.977 0.986 














                                                                    
26 We use the variable level from the ICTWSS database of Visser (2015) which reports the predominant level at which wage 
bargaining takes place. 
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Table B2: Differences between group of countries with strong institutions 
 Manufacturing Non-manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Top Bottom Top Bottom 
OFFSH -0.13 -0.55 -0.05 0.28 
OFFSH×Institutions 0.25 1.10** 0.20 0.21 
R&D intensity 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
R&D intensity×Institutions -0.03 -0.09 0.03** 0.00 
ICT 0.09 0.12 -0.07 0.07 
ICT×Institutions 0.11 -0.40*** 0.11 -0.27 
Net Imp.penCHN 0.01* 0.02* -0.01 0.08 
Net Imp.penCHN×Institutions 0.02*** 0.01 -0.04 0.02 
Constant -0.89** -1.35 -0.37 -1.79* 
N 2053 2048 919 919 
Industry× country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ctry×Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.955 0.906 0.989 0.989 





Table B3: patents/employee as alternative measure of process and product innovation in manufacturing 
industries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (4) 
 
top bottom top bottom top bottom top bottom 
OFFSH 0.36** 0.02 -0.08 -0.24 0.43** 0.07 -0.06 -0.25 
R&D intensity 
0.09*** 0.06 
0.03 -0.01     
Patent/employee   
  0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 
ICT 0.25*** 0.11 0.13** 0.00 0.25*** 0.12 0.13** 0.00 
Net Imp.penCHN 0.02* 0.01 0.01** 0.02 0.02* 0.01 0.01** 0.02 




EPL 0.01 -0.01   0.01 -0.01   
Adjusted Kaitz Index -0.07 0.31   -0.13 0.27   
Constant -2.64*** -2.80* 
-0.84 -1.23 -3.16*** -3.03*** -1.05* -1.41 
N 
1937 1932 
2053 2048 1937 1932 2053 2048 
Industry× country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
𝑅² 0.930 0.792 0.954 0.905 0.929 0.792 0.954 0.905 
                            
∗  









Table B4: Separating import penetration from China and export penetration to China in two separate 





   OFFSH -0.112 -0.271 
R&D intensity 0.032 -0.011 
ICT 0.135*** 0.014 
Imp.penCHN 
0.023 0.065 
Exp.pen.CHN -0.005 -0.019 
Constant -0.643 -1.001 
N 2053 2048 
Industry×country FEs Yes Yes 
Country×Year FEs Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.954 0.905 
    
    * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 






Table B5: Testing impact of downstream exposure to Chinese import penetration in non-manufacturing 
industries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
top bottom top bottom 
   OFFSH 0.26 0.29** 0.01 0.30 
R&D intensity -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
ICT 0.19*** 0.14*** -0.05 0.01 
Net Imp.penCHN 
4.77 7.75 -1.55 8.44 
Indirect Net Imp.pen.CHN 0.08 0.09 -0.02 -0.08 
Union Density -0.59 0.81   
EPL 0.06 0.06*   
Adjusted Kaitz index 0.07 0.18   
Constant -1.17 -2.16*** -0.38 -1.60** 
N 892 892 919 919 
Industry×country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
country×Year FEs No No Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.977 0.985 0.989 0.989 
    
   * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁  is the downstream exposure to net import penetration from China through the 
industrial links with domestic manufacturing industries. 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁 is expressed in levels rather than 
logs. For ease of interpretation of the coefficient on 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝. 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑁 , the 
dependent variable in columns (5) to (8)  is 100 times the log change in top or bottom polarization. 
 
